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Abstract
KVA represents the extra cost being charged by banks to clients in order to
remunerate banks’ shareholders for the mandatory regulatory capital provided by
them throughout the life of the deal. Therefore, KVA represents earnings charged
to clients that must be retained in the bank’s balance sheet and not be immediately
paid out as dividends. Since retained earnings are part of core TIER I capital, future
KVAs imply a deduction in today’s KVA calculation. In this paper we propose a KVA
formula that is consistent with this idea and in line with full replication of market,
counterparty and funding risks. Although the formula might seem cumbersome at
first sight due to its recursive nature, we show how calculate it in a Montecarlo XVA
engine without any approximation. Finally, we provide a numerical example where
the KVA obtained under this new formula is compared with other approaches yielding
significantly lower adjustments.
1 Introduction
Same as with any other economic activity, derivatives are financed with both equity and
debt. Since equity holders are willing to accept higher levels of risk in exchange for greater
expected returns, regulators enforce banks to fund a given proportion of their activity with
equity, so that potential losses in the future are absorbed by shareholders. Due to losses
experienced by banks in the last years, regulators have increased and are in the process of
increasing capital requirements for banks, that is, the proportion of the derivatives activity
to be financed by equity holders so that debt holders are better protected from losses.
The essential responsibility of bank managers is adding value for shareholders, who expect
a higher return for the higher level of risk they bear. Furthermore, since regulatory
capital requirements are being increased, the financial industry is putting more focus in
the measurement and management of return on capital generated by trading activities.
Contrary to what happens with debt holders, where the return they receive depends solely
on market conditions and can easily be extracted from bond quotes, the return expected
by the bank’s equity holders is unknown. Therefore, the management of the return on
equity is an internal discipline that will pay out in the long term, when banks that have
undergone this discipline are perceived as a better investment. In this paper we assume
that the bank top managers have determined a return on capital (aka hurdle rate) rKt .
In this new environment, a new adjustment has emerged which reflects the extra cost being
charged to banks’ counterparties in order to compensate equity holders throughout the life
of a new deal for the incremental regulatory capital implied by it. This new adjustment is
broadly known as KVA (Capital Value Adjustment). Nevertheless, the new adjustment is
still not in a mature stage and different questions arise with respect to how it should be
measured, how should it be accounted and how should it be managed.
KVA represents a cost charged to bank clients but represents a profit for the bank, since
it is money to be paid to the bank’s shareholders. Nevertheless, due to the fact that KVA
has been charged to compensate equity holders throughout the life of the deal, it should
1
not be paid out as dividends at the time of closing the deal, but kept in the bank’s balance
sheet.
One key feature of KVA is that due to the fact that it represents retained earnings, it is
part of Core TIER I capital. That is, KVA represents a source of core capital that has
not been provided by equity investor’s but by clients. This is crucial, since this means
that the bank does not need to ask shareholders for the full regulatory capital Kt, but
rather for Kt −REt, where REt represent retained earnings (in fact REt = KV At). As a
consequence, we do not need to ask our counterparties for the cost of remunerating Kt at
the hurdle rate rKt . It is enough to ask for the cost of remunerating Kt−KV At. But this
changes the magnitude of KV At, and thus the quantity that we should fund via equity.
It is in fact a recursive problem, but this can be solved with no approximation.
For clarity of exposition, but without loss of generality, we assume that the bank enters into
a new uncollateralized derivative transaction with a positive NPV for the bank after all
adjustments have been made (CVA, FVA, KVA). We do not take DVA into consideration
since it is must be deducted from capital. Nevertheless, we include FVA since, as shown in
this paper, both funding cost and benefit can actually be hedged, although a clear position
with respect to this has not yet been clarified by regulators.
2 Impact of retained earnings in the cost of capital
In this section we present the impact of retained earnings on KVA. We will first introduce
the “traditional” KVA approach and then we will explain what we think the right way of
taking into account the cost of capital should be.
2.1 “Traditional” approach to KVA
KVA is a topic that is currently being discussed in the industry, but most papers devoted
to KVA follow the guidelines of [6, 7, 5, 2]. The approach establishes a hedging equation
for the full price (including capital costs) of the derivative. Since regulation imposes that
the derivative must be supported by capital to absorb possible unexpected losses, the bank
should charge a quantity that allows it to remunerate the shareholders for their investment.
Under this approach, it is assumed that all of the regulatory capital supporting the deal
comes from shareholders. It is also suggested in [6] that this capital reduces external
funds obtained from debt holders. This seems to make sense, although it is not always
the market practice.
If we assume that regulatory capital is used to partially fund the derivative, therefore
reducing funds obtained from debt holders, we are in a situation like the one in figure 1.
Figure 1 represents the contribution to the balance sheet of the bank of a particular
deal (or set of deals). V Ft is the value of the derivative taking into account market risk,
counterparty credit risk and funding costs but not considering shareholder’s compensation.
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Figure 1: Assets and liabilities: K accounts for capital and E accounts for shareholder’s equity.
That is, V Ft represents the NPV if it was funded only with debt. Vt represents the
value of the derivative taking into consideration every component, including shareholder’s
remuneration. We have also included hedges (market and counterparty credit risk) closed
with interbank counterparties (which we have assumed to be positive in the picture without
loosing generality). Notice that due to the fact that market hedges are collateralized, they
are funded through the corresponding collateral account.
To summarize, assets consist of the value of the derivative V Ft plus the value of the hedges.
Liabilities are composed of the collateral account (to fund collateralized hedges) plus equity
and debt (to fund the uncollateralized derivative). Notice that the amount of equity is
determined by regulatory capital. Notice also that V Ft − Vt represents retained earnings,
since the bank has paid Vt for a derivative whose value would be V
F
t had it been fully
financed with debt.
The idea behind traditional KVA approaches is that since Kt represents capital, it all has
to be remunerated at the hurdle rate rKt . The cost of remuneratingKt at r
K
t during the life
of the derivative is precisely the KVA under this approach. To be precise, the term known
as KVA in [6] does not fully account for this cost, since there is also a contribution in the
funding term due to the full Vt appearing in the formula, which is also affected by KV At.
The capital amount Kt can obviously be used to fund the derivative. In [6] this possibility
is discussed, so that two different extremes can be contemplated: one under which capital
is not used to reduce external funding and the opposite, where it is recognized that capital
partially offsets funding through debt.
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2.2 Our approach
The main difference with the traditional approach is that we consider the implications of
the fact that KVA is a profit that it is not immediately distributed among shareholders.
This means that it is a retained earning. But retained earnings are considered as CET1
capital by regulators, thus reducing the amount the bank needs to get from shareholders.
Since the shareholder’s contribution is lower, KVA will be lower. The KVA calculation
becomes recursive, since KVA has an impact on shareholder’s equity, and shareholder’s
equity has an impact on KVA. We will see in section 4 that this recursivity can be solved.
As a consequence of all this, the KVA figures will be in most cases lower than in the
“traditional” approach.
The bank’s balance sheet contribution of a deal under our approach can be seen in figure
2
Figure 2: Assets and liabilities: K accounts for capital, E accounts for shareholder’s equity and
RE accounts for retained earnings. Vt and V
F
t are seen from investor’s point of view.
Note that KVA at value date can be higher than the regulatory capital. This can be
the case of long maturity derivatives. This means that at value date we do not need
any shareholder’s equity. In the rest of the paper we will assume that, in that case, the
surplus of capital we get via retained earnings is also used to reduce shareholder’s equity
requirements (thus we still get a rKt benefit from them) in other trading activities. A
similar consideration will be made with respect to funding, avoiding any non linear term
in the pricing equations. This is in line with realistic situations, since banks will always
fund their activities with both equity and debt, and a situation in which any of the two
terms vanishes is not probable.
In next section we present the mathematical framework for KVA, starting from the
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replicating portfolio for a derivative taking all these effects into account.
3 Obtaining the pricing equation through replication
For the seek of simplicity, we will study the case of a single derivative, but extension to
portfolio level can easily be done. Let us consider a non-collateralized derivative, as seen
from the bank’s perspective, whose price Vt depends on the state of certain underlying St
at maturity T . We make explicit its dependence on the different risk factors,
Vt := V (t, St, h
I
t , N
I
t , f
H
t )
Where
• hIt is the investor’s overnight CDS premium. We will assume, for simplicity but
without loosing generality, that the dynamics of the CDS curve are driven by one
factor (the short term CDS spread). Thus, under the real measure, P, we assume
that
dhI(t) = µPh(t)dt+ σh(t) dW
P
h (t)
• N It = 1{τI≤t} accounts for the investor default’s time.
• ft denotes the short term funding rate at which the trading desk can borrow money
from the bank’s internal treasury. We will assume, for simplicity but without loosing
generality, that the dynamics of the bank’s funding curve are driven by one factor
(the short term funding curve). Therefore, under P
df(t) = µPf (t)dt+ σ
f
t dW
P
f (t)
At anytime t, assets must be equal to liabilities. Therefore
V Ft + αtHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market Hedge
+
2∑
j=1
ǫ
j
tCDS(t, tj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA Hedge︸ ︷︷ ︸
Assets
= ωtB
f (t, T ) + βft︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt
+ βCt︸︷︷︸
Collateral Account
+ Et︸︷︷︸
Equity
+ REt︸︷︷︸
Ret. Earnings︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital=Kt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liabilities
(1)
where
• Ht represents the price of a perfectly collateralized derivative that is written on St.
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• CDS(t, tj) denotes the price of a perfectly collateralized CDS with maturity tj
written on the investor. Notice that in a one factor world for the dynamics of
the investor’s CDS curve, two CDSs with different maturities must be used to hedge
both default and spread risks.
• βCt stands for the collateral account due to collateralized hedges. At time t it will
equal to:
βCt = αtHt +
2∑
j=1
ǫjCDS(t, tj) (2)
Thus,
dβCt =

αtHt + 2∑
j=1
ǫjCDS(t, tj)

 ctdt (3)
where ct the collateral accrual rate (OIS rate).
• REt represents retained earnings coming from the extra cost charged to the investor
to remunerate shareholders. Notice that it is fundamental for the retained earnings
component to be homogeneous in time. This means that at a future time u > t, the
retained earnings adjustment should be the same as if the deal was closed at time
u. Other retained earnings metric would benefit some shareholders at the expense
of some others throughout time. This implies that at any time, the following must
hold:
REt = V
F
t − Vt (4)
• Et represents shareholders’ equity. Notice that it is the only component in (1) that is
not marked to market, since this term is accounted on a historical basis. Since time
t capital must be compensated, a stream of dividends must be paid in the (t, t+ dt)
interval. Therefore
dEt = r
K
t Etdt (5)
• Kt: denotes the regulatory capital associated to the deal and its hedges at time t.
Since retained earnings are part of CET1:
Kt = Et +REt (6)
• β
f
t denotes the un-secured bank account (short term funding) and B
f (t, T ) a term
bond issued by the derivatives hedger (long term funding). Notice that the bank
must fund the portion of the derivatives that is not funded with Equity. Therefore
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β
f
t + ωtB
f (t, T ) = Vt − Et (7)
In line with [3] we assume that the mixture of short and long term funding will
be determined so that shareholders become immune to changes in ft (the bank’s
funding curve).
Since ft represents the bank’s short term funding rate
dβ
f
t = ftβ
f
t dt (8)
• αt, ǫ
j
t , ωt are determined so that the different sources of risks (market, credit and
funding) are eliminated under normal market conditions. Therefore, shareholders
receive the stream of dividends rKt unless an unexpected loss occurs. By normal
market conditions, we refer to continuous changes in market variables, credit default
swap spreads and counterparty defaults. Obviously, if unexpected losses occur,
shareholders should absorb them. Unexpected losses could arise due to sudden
moves in market variables and / or spreads or if non market quoted volatilities or
correlations, recoveries or any other unhedgeable parameters are mispriced (model
risk).
Notice that the bank does not try to hedge its own default since this source of risk cannot
be hedged. Therefore, no DVA component will be reflected in our pricing equation, in line
with regulation.
If we differentiate both sides of (1) and eliminate all sources of uncertainty as in [3, 1] and
if we apply (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8), we get the following PDE for Vt
LVt +
hIt
(1−R)
∆Vt = Vtft + Et
(
rKt − ft
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γt
s.t V (T ) = VT (9)
Where R represents the recovery rate of the counterparty and
LVt =
∂Vt
∂t
+ (rt − qt)St
∂Vt
∂St
+ (µft −M
f
t σ
f
t )
∂Vt
∂ft
+ (µIt −M
I
t σ
I
t )
∂Vt
∂hIt
+12
∂2Vt
∂S2t
S2t (σ
S
t )
2 + 12
∂2Vt
∂ft
2 (σ
f
t )
2 + 12
∂2Vt
∂hIt
2 (σ
I
t )
2
+ ∂
2Vt
∂Stft
Stσ
S
t σ
f
t ρ
S,f
t +
∂2Vt
∂Sth
I
t
Stσ
S
t σ
I
t ρ
S,I
t +
∂2Vt
∂hIt ft
σIt σ
f
t ρ
I,f
t
(10)
Using the same arguments as before, it can be seen that V Ft must fulfill with the following
PDE,
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LV Ft +
hIt
(1−R)
∆V Ft = V
F
t ft
s.t V F (T ) = VT (11)
After applying Feyman-Kac, equation (11) is equivalent to,
V Ft = E
Q
[
e−
∫ T
t
fsds VT
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V
ft
t
−EQ
[
e−
∫ τI
t fsds 1{τI<T}
(
πτI − V
ft
τI
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA over price with funding
(12)
where
πt = R
(
V Close-Outt
)+
+
(
V Close-Outt
)−
In [3], a different expression which implies the same expectation is obtained by using the
collateral rate as discounting rate. In the next section we will make use of (12)
Going back to equation (9), using identity (6) and (4), the final PDE for the value of the
derivative, accounting for capital becomes,
LVt +
hIt
(1−R)
∆Vt = Vt ct + Vt (ft − ct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FVA Contrib.
+ Kt γt︸ ︷︷ ︸
KVA Contrib.
+
(
Vt − V
F
t
)
γt︸ ︷︷ ︸
REVA Contrib.
s.t V (T ) = VT (13)
Where REV A represents a retained earnings value adjustment contribution.
And by applying Feyman-Kac,
Vt =E
Q
[
e−
∫
T
t
c(s)ds VT
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V
ct
t
−EQ
[
e−
∫ τI
t
c(s)ds 1{τI<T}
(
πτI − V
ct
τI
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA Contrib.
−
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫
s
t
c(u)du 1{τI>s} Vs (fs − cs)
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
FVA Contrib.
−
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫
s
t
c(u)du 1{τI>s} Ks γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
KVA Contrib.
+
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫
s
t
c(u)du 1{τI>s}
(
V Fs − Vs
)
γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retained Earning VA Contrib. (REVA)
(14)
Notice that a new term arises compared to the pricing equation in the existing literature.
This term reduces the capital value adjustment. Notice also that the full price Vs appears in
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the expressions of FVA Contribution and REVA Contribution, so the formula is recursive.
Furthermore, the term V Fs in REVA Contribution is also complex since it is given by (12).
It is fundamental to distinguish between retained earnings, which is equal to KVA, and
the pure KVA contribution. KVA (and retained earnings) is equal to V Ft − Vt, whereas
the pure KVA contribution is given by −
∫ T
s=tE
Q
[
e−
∫ s
t
c(u)du 1{τI>s} Ks γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds.
4 Calculation in a Monte Carlo framework
In this section we show how to solve the recursive nature of equation (14). The PDE in
(13) can be re-expressed in its equivalent form,
LVt +
hIt
(1−R)
∆Vt = Vt r
K
t +
(
Kt − V
F
t
)
γt
s.t V (T ) = VT (15)
or in terms of expected values,
Vt =E
Q
[
e−
∫ T
t
rK(s)ds VT
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V
rK
t
− EQ
[
e−
∫ τI
t rK(s)ds 1{τI<T}
(
πτI − V
rK
τI
) ∣∣∣∣Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA over price with capital
−
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫ s
t
rK(u)du 1{τI>s} Ks γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
KVA Contrib. discounted at rK
+
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫ s
t
rK(u)du 1{τI>s} V
F
s γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
rKt discounted REVA Contrib.
(16)
At first sight, this term might seem difficult to solve. Let us try to further develop it,
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REV A′t =
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫
s
t
rK(u)du 1{τI>s} V
F
s γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds
=
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫
s
t
rK(u)du 1{τI>s} V
ft
s γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
∫ T
s=t
EQ
[
e−
∫
s
t
rK(u)du 1{τI>s}
[ ∫ T
u=s
EQ
[
e−
∫
u
s
fxdx1{τI>u}
(
πu − V
ft
u
)
dNu
∣∣∣∣Fs
] ]
γs
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
(17)
The first term, I, in last equation does not imply further complications with respect to
those found to solve for the CVA term. In general terms, we must only provide a pricer
that is allows us to price the derivative conditional to the state of the economy at future
dates.
The second term in the latter equation can be simplified by changing the integration order.
so this term becomes
II =
∫ T
u=t
EQ
[(
πu − V
ft
u
)
1{τ>u}
(∫ u
s=t
e−
∫ s
t
rK(x)dxe−
∫ u
s
fxdxγs ds
)
dNu
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(18)
Just by taking into account that rK(t) = ft + γt,
II =
∫ T
u=t
EQ
[
e−
∫ u
t
f(x)dx Aγ(t, u) 1{τ>u}
(
πu − V
ft
u
)
dNu
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(19)
where Aγ(t, u) =
(
1− e−
∫ u
t
γsds
)
.
Note that this term is very similar to the CVA over price with funding in (12).
5 Numerical results
In this section we provide numerical results for the price of a FX forward for different
maturities and strikes. Note that the conclusions obtained here will be easily extrapolated
to cross-currency swaps. For illustrative purposes, we have considered counterparty risk
capital under SA-CCR and CVA regulatory capital under Basel III. We are neglecting
market risk capital, but this can be a fair assumption if we consider that it is a back
to back trade with a collateralized counterparty and hedging CDS are also collateralized.
We assume the counterparty’s rating to be BBB. The only stochastic magnitude is the
FX underlying, with volatility 10%. The different rates involved are: funding rate = 2%,
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counterparty credit spread = 2%, domestic rate = 1%, foreign rate = 0.5%, collateral
rate = 1% and hurdle rate = 15%. Notional is set to 1 and FX spot is 1. We have not
considered the effect of the hedging portfolio in regulatory capital calculations.
In figure 3 we show the results obtained for different levels of moneyness for a maturity of
10y. The strike is set to 1 in all cases. We have called Trad KVA 0 the KVA calculation
introduced in [6] (what we call “traditional” KVA) without using capital to reduce funding
needs (φ = 0 in that paper), and Trad KVA 1 the traditional KVA using capital to reduce
funding needs (φ = 1 in that paper). We can see that there is a strong KVA reduction for
all levels of moneyness, being the reduction of around 50% for the ATM forward.
Figure 3: NPV and KVA for different approaches as a function of the spot. The KVA correction
is the ratio between KVA and traditional KVA with no capital used for funding. Legend:
Collateralized: price without any XVAs. Funding: price with CVA and FVA, Trad KVA 0:
traditional KVA, capital not used for funding the deal. Trad KVA 1: traditional KVA, capital
used for funding the deal
In figure 4 we show the results obtained for different maturities for an ATM deal. We see
that the retained earnings KVA reduction increases with maturity. For a 30y maturity,
the recursite KVA is 27% of the value obtained under the traditional approach. The KVA
values for significant maturities are given in table 1
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Figure 4: NPV and KVA for different approaches as a function of maturity. The KVA correction
is the ratio between KVA and traditional KVA with no capital used for funding. Legend:
Collateralized: price without any XVAs. Funding: price with CVA and FVA, Trad KVA 0:
traditional KVA, capital not used for funding the deal. Trad KVA 1: traditional KVA, capital
used for funding the deal
Maturity Trad KVA 0 Trad KVA 1 Our KVA Savings wrt Trad KVA 0
1y 0.0048 0.0042 0.0039 18.6%
3y 0.0248 0.0215 0.0177 28.4%
5y 0.0502 0.0435 0.0318 36.6%
10y 0.1309 0.1134 0.0644 50.8%
20y 0.3231 0.2800 0.1125 65.2%
30y 0.5169 0.4480 0.1470 71.6%
Table 1: KVA values under the different approaches for significant maturities.
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Figure 5: KVA under the three different approaches compared with spot capital for an ATM deal
as a function of maturity.
In figure 5 we have plotted spot capital and KVA under the 3 approaches for an at
the money forward as a function of maturity. Notice that with the exception of short
maturities, KVA is greater than spot capital, specially for non recursive KVA approaches.
The situation where KVA is greater than spot capital is a situation under which the
shareholder’s equity is decreased since the KVA charged to clients exceeds the regulatory
capital. Notice that in this situation, non recursive KVA approaches assume that the
equity holder receives a return on capital rKt even in situations under which the shareholder’s
investment is not increased, but reduced. We believe that this is a drawback of non
recursive approaches.
6 Conclusions
The main conclusions of the paper are:
• Due to regulation, a given percentage of derivative businesses must be financed with
shareholder’s equity.
• KVA is the quantity that banks charge to clients to remunerate the shareholders for
their investment throughout time.
• KVA is a cost charged to clients, but a profit for banks.
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• KVA must be kept in the bank’s balance sheet as retained earnings, and therefore
it is eligible as capital.
• Thus, not all the capital needs associated to the derivative must be obtained from
shareholders since the KVA term is charged to clients.
• Since retained earnings (REt) are capital, we do not need to remunerate the shareholders
for full regulatory capital Kt but for Kt −REt.
• The problem has a recursive nature, but can be solved.
• KVA gets significantly reduced compared to the “traditional” KVA calculation.
• This can have a deep impact in trade approval criteria.
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